How to modernize OpenStack
Artem Goncharov
2026-10-23
Ask of every call: what makes the receiver believe the caller?
| Question | Today | Zero-trust model |
|---|---|---|
| Who (authn) | Fernet token, password, app credential, trust | Short-lived JWT; SPIFFE mTLS inside the control plane |
| Where (scope) | Baked into the token at issuance | Stated per request |
| What (authz) | Roles frozen in the token, oslo.policy per service | Decided per request; policy asks Keystone |
| Platform | Credential | Where scope lives | Workload identity |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS | SigV4 / STS short-lived | In the request | Instance profile, IRSA |
| GCP | OAuth2 access token | In the request | Service account |
| Azure | Entra ID JWT | In the role assignment | Managed identity |
| Kubernetes | Projected, audience-bound token | In the request | Service account, SPIFFE |
| OpenStack | Fernet token | In the token | App credential in the guest |
{
"match": {"all_of": [{"type": "condition", "equals": {
"claim": "spiffe.id",
"value": "spiffe://cloud.trust.domain/service/nova-api"}}]},
"identity": {"user_name": "svid-nova-api", "is_system": true},
"authorizations": [{"type": "system", "system_id": "all",
"roles": [{"name": "service"}]}]
}An unmapped SVID gets 401, not "everything".
SPIFFE mTLS transport for auth_token is a WIP Gerrit change, piloted against Nova in CI.
Known gap in the POC: the client does not yet verify the server's SPIFFE ID.
GET /v2.1/servers HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer <JWT>
OpenStack-Target: project="8e3f..."
| Textbook zero-trust | What we do |
|---|---|
| Replicated authz per failure domain | Data plane is optional; small clouds query the control plane directly |
| Instant revocation | Replication lag, measured and bounded; offline JWT = token lifetime |
| Per-host cryptographic node identity | Devstack join token only proves possession of the token |
| Textbook zero-trust | What we (didn't yet) do |
|---|---|
| Identity for every guest, including Octavia amphorae | Amphora certificate bootstrap is out of scope for now |
| Continuous, risk-based re-evaluation | Not done: a check per request against live state, no posture or anomaly signals |
| Network microsegmentation | Not done: identity is enforced, network policy is left to the deployment |
| Signing keys in an HSM | Optional HSM for encrypting data, not for the keys themselves |